April 10, 2023 – The receipt of new applications for this advice has been suspended. Consultancy concerning protection against WMD is available to a limited extent.
With a more detailed perception of world developments in context, it is obvious that the world will most probably face difficult times soon. At this moment, the question of whether a third world war will take place is basically not being considered, but only when it will take place. Its probability increases rapidly every year and can basically erupt at almost any time. If World War III takes place, massive use of nuclear weapons can be expected, even in Europe.
There is a universally widespread and propagated myth about nuclear weapons, that after a thermonuclear war everything would be permanently and heavily contaminated with radioactive fallout. This fabrication comes from utter ignorance of the effects of nuclear weapons. In fact, the level of radiation from the fallout initially decreases rapidly, and with sufficient knowledge of protection against the effects of nuclear weapons it is possible to undertake essential outdoor work for a limited time even in more heavily contaminated areas already within a few days after the explosion, and with a relatively small risk of mild radiation sickness. Above all, a long-term stay in such an area however requires suitable shielding against radioactive radiation, and consequently at least a properly adapted improvised shelter is an absolute necessity.
It is also worth mentioning that while the general public generally thinks that with use of nuclear weapons it would allegedly wipe out humanity, military chemists and generals usually plan to use nuclear weapons in conjunction with conventional weapons.
For example, if we would allow ten completely identical nuclear weapons to explode at the same height in ten different locations, the effects of each of these explosions would be more or less different at a given distance from the epicentre. When we focus our attention on the effects of nuclear explosions on houses, such a situation could also occur that from two completely identical houses, approximately only 20 m/yd apart, one could be basically beyond repair or seriously damaged and the other only slightly damaged. With regards to the surrounding radioactive contamination of the terrain by local fallout, then in one house the measured radiation values could be negligible, while in another house it could be necessary to build strong shielding barriers against gamma radiation. It follows that without relatively extensive calculations, it is not easy to determine the probable extent of damage to a given object, as well as the level of radiation inside the object and in its immediate vicinity either. Thanks to knowledge of the surroundings of the shelter in particular, it is possible to perform the calculations more precisely, and so attain the realistically expected values of the individual effects of a nuclear explosion. A detailed evaluation of the actual effects of nuclear explosions consequently requires a lot of counting and careful assessment of each explosion based on a whole range of different aspects. It is obvious therefore that some 'calculators' of the effects of nuclear explosions, which are commonly available on the internet, are virtually totally useless not even for a rough estimate of the effects of nuclear explosions in cities.
As the distance from a nuclear explosion increases, its destructive effects decrease. While in its vicinity it is better to hide in some underground fallout shelter, at a greater distance it is enough to hide for example, only in the garage, the ground floor of the house and the like. Although the effects of nuclear weapons are generally too exaggerated, it is not advisable to underestimate them. However, often even completely primitive protective measures might accomplish complete miracles.
Most people live within a distance of several dozen kilometres/miles from some important target for which destruction or at least damage could be used a nuclear weapon. So, in the event of a nuclear war, a substantial proportion of people would, to varying degrees, face the destructive effects of nuclear explosions. While in one area people could have the biggest problems with the blast wave, in others for a change they could be threatened mainly by thermal radiation, penetrating radiation or radiation from fallout. But somewhere they could be forced to deal with the more destructive effects of a nuclear explosion at the same time. Larger problems would arise in a situation where there were several nuclear explosions in the vicinity of a given area, the devastating effects of which would at least partially overlap. In such a case, it would often even depend upon the sequence of nuclear explosions and their time interval.
The extent of the effects of nuclear weapons depends mainly on their type (a fission or thermonuclear weapon), their composition (ratio of fission and fusion parts etc.), the strength of the explosion, the type of explosion (underground without the ejection of soil, underground with the ejection of soil, surface, low air, high air, at high altitude, underwater and on the water surface), the current atmospheric conditions (the intensity of precipitation and fogs, the degree of sky cover by clouds and their type and height, the wind direction and speed from the ground to the top of the radioactive cloud, the amount of dust in the atmosphere etc.), the shape of the landscape, the subsoil and its moisture (for underground and surface explosion), the number and type of obstacles between the shelter and the explosion (dimensions and type of buildings, plus the density, height, type and area of vegetation etc.), the composition of the earth's surface between the explosion and the shelter (gravel, asphalt, water, grass etc.), the altitude (of the target, the explosion and shelter), the type of shelter and at what angle of impact the blast wave and thermal radiation acts relative to it, the nature of the target (city, dam etc.), the reflectance properties of the earth's surface (mainly in air, surface, and water surface explosions), the geographical latitude and of course, the distance from the centre of the explosion and the time elapsed since the explosion.
In order to determine the effects of a nuclear explosion on humans it is also important to know, apart from the information given in the previous paragraph, what is the time of day (day, dusk or night), where the given person is located at the moment of the explosion and shortly afterwards (near a wall, by a window etc.), his position (on his stomach, sideways to the explosion etc.), skin color and body physique, his age and state of health, if he was looking towards the explosion at that given moment, what clothes is he wearing (summer, winter, their colour, moisture, the material used and tightness to the body). If there is radioactive contamination of the surrounding terrain by local fallout, it subsequently depends upon the length of his stay in the given area, when he entered the contaminated area (the time elapsed since the explosion and since the arrival of radioactive fallout), how is he protected by quality shielding in the face of ionizing radiation, whether he uses suitable protective aids, if he consumes uncontaminated food and water, how well he has treated all fresh injuries, if he has been exposed before already (for what time, to what doses of radiation was he exposed to, which part of the body was exposed, what were the possible time intervals between each exposure etc.), and of course, it also depends on his knowledge of how to behave in a given situation and his speed of reaction.
Protection against radioactive radiation from possible fallout is just one of many things that need to be addressed. The effects of a blast wave or thermal radiation can often pose a more serious threat than some radioactive fallout, especially at shorter distances from the centre of a nuclear explosion. In some cases, penetrating radiation can represent the main danger.
When calculating, we work with a range of input parameters. We anticipate with those the worst conditions that could occur regarding the expected strength of a given type of nuclear explosion. If the calculations are made for some smaller targets, against which it would be sufficient to use relatively “small” nuclear weapons, we take into consideration that during war there is not always time to wait for the supply of appropriate ammunition. It means that if the attacker does not have nuclear weapons of the optimal size at hand, he can use even more powerful nuclear weapons to destroy the nominated targets. Fortunately, the age of large nuclear weapons that were prepared for use during The Cold War is over. Although it may not seem so at first glance, it is better to use several weaker nuclear weapons to destroy a large target than one very powerful one. If, against a big city for example instead of one 5 Mt (5,000 kt) nuclear weapon (the explosion releases the same amount of energy as ten 500 kt nuclear weapons of the same type and composition) we used three to four 500 kt nuclear weapons, often it would not be a big problem to cause even significantly greater damage with them.
Our consultancy service is focused upon how to safely deal with the effects of possible surrounding nuclear explosions in the nominated area.
In the consultancy, during the calculations, amongst other things we also deal with the speed of the ascending fireball, the anticipated horizontal deviation of the nuclear warhead from the planned centre of the explosion, the loss of energy from the blast wave due to demolished obstructions, natural (vegetation, shape of the landscape) and man-made (buildings) obstacles, the size of the thermal impulse (we also take into account the reflection of light and heat radiation from the surrounding environment of the house / hiding place and possibly even from clouds), the possibility of burns to people in the house and its immediate surroundings, the level of radiation on the ground from local fallout with respect to the surrounding terrain and buildings, in which we take into account also the extent of damage after the possible destructive action of the blast wave, light and heat radiation, and we also address the problems associated with mass nuclear strikes. Of course, we make recommendations on how to minimize the extent of potential personal injuries due to the action of the blast wave, light and heat radiation. If we find out that there is a risk that the interior furnishings of the house could catch fire, we add advice on how to prevent such problems. There is also no lack of information on how to minimize the risk of a mild degree of radiation sickness developing while staying in the given shelter and its immediate surroundings.
The following table shows the approximate minimum distances of the different types of structures from the centre of a presumed target of a nuclear attack, which are needed to provide a recommendation. In the case of a large city, it is advisable to calculate this distance from its edge. We will then adjust it. The distances in the table are determined with respect to the magnitude of the overpressure at the head of the blast wave of a 500 kt nuclear explosion (about 30 times stronger than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima). A brick building here means a building made of solid bricks. Buildings built from lightweight materials have a resilience closer to that of wooden buildings.
| Type of construction | Min. distance |
|---|---|
| brick | 6–8 km (3.7–5 mi) |
| wooden | 9–13 km (5.6–8.1 mi) |
| with a cellar underground | from 1.5 km (0.93 mi) |
In certain cases, it is possible to provide consultancy even for distances shorter than those listed in the table. It depends upon the shape of the terrain, the number and type of obstacles between your house and the target of the attack, the type of target (city, military base etc.) and on the existence of a cellar in your house. In such a case, the main requirement is a high probability of your survival without serious health complications and the preservation of essential parts of the house necessary for shielding gamma radiation from possible radioactive fallout.
If we conclude that there could be such significant damage to the house caused by the blast wave that it would not be possible to occupy it further, then we will discontinue the consultancy. It would be a needless waste of money for you. Instead, we will recommend you another suitable solution.
The consultancy is especially important for those who already have or plan to build a fallout shelter, or an improvised hiding place.
This consultancy does not deal with chemical, toxin or possible biological contamination in the given area and does not address air filtration and water treatment either. Regarding the provision of quality air in the conditions during the use of WMD, our consultancy concerning air filtration or consultancy concerning ventilation without filter ventilation equipment (FVE) can be used. The issue of water acquisition and treatment in combat conditions is dealt with by our consultancy concerning the provision of drinking water. We deal with more general questions in the consultancy concerning protection against WMD.
After receiving the necessary information, (electronically, by regular mail, or personally by prior arrangement), we will send notification when everything should be prepared for you. You will be asked to pay just before we prepare our recommendations and tables.
In order to understand and use the information provided in the recommendations and tables, it is not necessary to take any course on nuclear weapons beforehand, nor is it necessary to read any literature about them, as their individual effects are briefly explained in the introductory section. Everything is presented in a comprehensible form so that the stated information can be used by anyone who has completed basic education.
As you know the area well, it is necessary that you provide us with a list of critical objects and their location, if they are within a distance of 20–30 km (12–19 mi) from the shelter. Looking at larger cities (approximately over 100,000 inhabitants), chemical plants, waterworks, large industrial centres, swimming and winter stadia, fertilizer and fuel depots, refineries, power stations, civil and military airports (including former ones), radar stations, air defence systems, military bases and ammunition depots, military fallout shelters, larger dams etc. For verification, we will also carry out our own search for surrounding targets, for the destruction of which nuclear weapons could be used.
We also need the following information: the exact location of the house/shelter (marked on a map or the geographical coordinates), the construction of the building (wooden, brick, stone etc.), a schematic drawing of the entire house, including the internal partitions. For all walls, (i.e. also partitions), it is necessary to state the material, height, thickness, location and dimensions of openings such as windows and doors. For windows, it is necessary to know the type of glazing (single, double or triple glass). It is also important whether the house has a cellar and how deep below the level of the outdoor terrain is the floor in the cellar.
Why is it necessary to state the dimensions of the windows, the thickness of the walls, ceilings and dividing walls including the material used and lots of other information, for the house in which the improvised shelter is planned to be built? That measuring will take me hours of time.
It is about your health and possibly your life. If we do not obtain the basic initial information, then we have no choice but to estimate a lot of the information very broadly. We cannot then determine which part of the house would be the most suitable to shelter in, if the ceilings represent a sufficient shielding layer against gamma radiation from possible radioactive fallout, what is the risk of fire in certain parts of the house… Simply put, when the recommendations and tables are being compiled, it is a shame that because of insufficient inputs we cannot make them more accurate.
I studied what thicknesses of different materials can halve the radiation from the fallout. In this way, I can reduce the level of radiation inside more than a hundredfold compared to the outside. Will that be enough for me?
It may or may not be enough. In the event of severe radioactive contamination of the terrain by local fallout, this quoted value can be completely insufficient. In addition, this shielding layer against gamma radiation does not solve the potential problem of blast wave, seismic waves, or light and heat radiation, and may not be sufficient against penetrating radiation either.
I have a fallout shelter built in the garden. Would I be able to use this consultancy service in such a case?
If the fallout shelter was built by a construction company which claims that it builds fallout shelters and knows almost nothing about the effects of nuclear weapons while doing so, which is quite common, then even the underground installation may not be completely safe in terms of seismic waves, air filtration or radiation from fallout. Even if the given shelter ensures sufficient protection against gamma radiation, still sooner or later one has to climb out of it, even if only maybe for a few hours a day. If the surrounding area was more affected by radioactive fallout, the recommendations with tables would then provide key guidance on how long to stay safely outside each day at different times after the explosion. The shelter itself therefore equates to only half the battle, as it does not prevent possible exposure when staying outside of it. But the tables and recommendations will fix that.
Do more companies offer similar consultancy service? What is the possible difference in quality?
We are not concerned if other companies offer a similar consultancy. We are however almost certain that our consultancy service has no competition across the world in terms of quality, scope and practically usable information. The reason is that the area of protection against weapons of mass destruction is narrowly specialized and there are few people who can say that they are roughly oriented in it. But there are plenty of people who read a few books about protection against WMD and they think that they know everything about it.
Why do I have to look for important targets in the vicinity when I pay for the consultancy?
Ourselves, we always look at satellite images in the vicinity of the planned hiding place, but from these images, some key objects are basically difficult to recognize. For example, military facilities could look like a manufacturing plant. As you know your surroundings better than we do, it is easier for you and it is possible to say that it may even be vital to choose as many targets as possible. Then from them we select those which we consider critical and take their position into account in the calculations.
Why do not you compile tables and recommendations in the case of a big city?
The problem with large cities (from the point of view of expanse and number of inhabitants – at least hundreds of thousands of people) is that several nuclear explosions would be needed to use to cause significant damage. The nature of targets in these cities could vary depending upon the density of the day and night population, the type, height and density of buildings, the available number of nuclear weapons for the attack, etc. In order to possibly say which part of the city would probably provide sufficient guarantees for survival without serious injuries, it would be necessary to work up a whole range of possible attack combinations. If someone though would seek such a consultancy, they have to count with a several times higher price and also with the fact that the part of the city in which they live could prove to be very risky. So, the question is, whether the outright conclusions of such a consultancy would meet the expectations of the person and whether it would not be better for him to rather invest money in the purchase of a part of a forest for example, where he would make an improvised shelter.
If there was a significant risk that a blast wave in the area could destroy my house / hiding place, would it mean that I would not pay anything for the consultancy?
Exactly. The consultancy service is provided only for areas where we can say almost with certainty that any given hiding place would not be destroyed and therefore where your survival can be “guaranteed” from the point of view of the effects of possible surrounding nuclear strikes on foreseeable stationary targets.
If I have an improvised shelter in the house, will the consultancy help me to turn it into a “fallout shelter”?
You could say that. Unlike most owners of fallout shelters, you will have the information on how to manage over the long-term in the given area. Of course, you will also have information on how to manage over the short-term, but the owners of most fallout shelters do not have to be so interested in that.
The waiting time for the compilation of tables and recommendations is relatively long. Therefore, it might be my turn as late as “after the war”. Can I speed it up by paying an extra surcharge?
We are a specialized company focused on protection against weapons of mass destruction and we solve questions from people around the world. People who do not wait to be told by the mainstream media that another world war cannot be ruled out subsequently have a greater advantage. People who do not rely too much on the mainstream news media in this regard, but more on their judgment, sometimes have a certain head start in terms of time over others. As for the question regarding a possible surcharge, suffice to say that the compilation of tables and recommendations cannot be accelerated by any surcharge. That would mean skipping over another waiting applicant, which we do not do.
The tables and recommendations are compiled according to
a waiting list, and the current lead time is about
4–5 months.
(April 10, 2023 – We are
no longer accepting new applications for this advice. Consultancy
concerning protection against WMD is still available
to a limited extent.)
We send tables and recommendations by registered mail by Czech Post, but personal collection is also possible by prior arrangement.
Payment is made by bank transfer or in cash by prior arrangement (some other payment methods are possible). We send the request for payment shortly before we start processing the tables and recommendations. After receiving the payment, everything is dispatched or ready for personal collection within about a week.
The price for tables and recommendations on how to deal with the possible effects of one or more nuclear explosions in a given area is 9,969 CZK (approx. 467 USD or 427 EUR). The price in USD or EUR depends on the current rate of exchange of the Czech crown on the date of payment. Postage or personal collection, by prior arrangement, is without charge. Information are in English (translation into other languages is possible).
If an order is cancelled prior to payment, no fee will be charged. If the order is cancelled within two days after payment, the fee is 20 %, within three days 50 %, and over three days 100 % (in this case, everything will be delivered).
By purchasing, you agree to the terms and conditions.